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WELCOME REMARKS 
 
It is well-known that world of education plays a significant part of the economic 
development. First is by conducting policies analysis and sectoral researchers to pro-
vide reliable input to policy makers. Second, it to create a better generation through 
human development. Such application also works in the area of competition policy 
and law, whereas the world of academia is an engine of changes for supporting the 
development of competition policy and law study of a nation or a region. 
The world of the future is a very rapidly changing world. In order to take ad-
vantage of the dynamics wave of change, it requires a fast perceptual ability to all 
changes, so that it did not drift in the flow of change. That is why the study of com-
petition policy and law shall able to catch up with such robust development. Compe-
tition agency or regulator cannot stand alone to ride the wave of changes. It needs its 
relevant stakeholder to jointly assist them along the way, and that included the world 
of academics. 
However, the problem is, there has been slow growth of expertise in competition 
policy and law in East Asia. For the past decade, there has been no forum for the ac-
ademic to get together and discuss their recent works or studies in competition policy 
and law. Development in the number of the new expert in competition law in the re-
gion is also moving at a slow pace. 
That is why competition agency of Indonesia, KPPU, want to take such initiative 
to gather the academics in East Asia in the September‟s international seminar on 
competition policy, coincide with the 13th East Asia Top Level Officials Meeting on 
Competition Policy and Law. It hopes that at such seminar, the academic can declare 
the establishment of their network, the East Asia Academic Network on Competition 
Policy and Law. 
The East Asia Academic Network on Competition Policy will play the role of 
collaborating advance research and broadening network among themselves and with 
the regulator with the main objective of improving or developing knowledge hub and 
expertise in competition policy and law in East Asia. 
In specific, the main objective of the East Asia Academic Network on Competi-
tion Policy and Law is to serve as a virtual network of academics in East Asia having 
September 6, 2017  Nusa Dua, Bali 
KPPU | Proceeding International Seminar on Competition Policy and Law 
2 
 
interest in competition policy and law. The network will aim at improving the num-
ber of study or research in competition policy and law, as well as join hand with the 
competition agencies or regulators to build the expertise in competition area of both 
competition agency and university. 
The network will consist of academics in competition policy and law from uni-
versities in East Asia. Their chairmanship and management will be defined by them-
selves. Competition agency or regulator at the initial stage will assist the network to 
build and expand themselves. They are expected to have a yearly meeting as a back-
to-back event with the East Asia Top Level Officials Meeting on Competition Policy 
and Law so that it can secure the involvement of competition agencies and regulators 
at their forum. 
In addition, their activities may include conducting researches and studies in 
competition policy and law, conducting training or capacity building related activi-
ties or to the public, creating a web portal for their knowledge hub, and providing 
their expertise to competition agency or regulator. 
Upon their establishment, they may generate their own funding in hosting events, 
and or get a support from competition agencies or regulators, or potential interna-
tional development partners who share their common interest. At the initial stage, 
KPPU will secure its funding to assist with their initial works (like research/study 
and annual conference), as well as assist them to talk and discuss with international 
development partners. 
It sincerely hopes that this proposal can be supported by all member of East Asia 
Top Level Officials Meeting on Competition Policy and Law (EATOP Meeting), so 
that KPPU and they can start their initial works following the establishment. 
Thank you. 
Jakarta, September 6, 2017 
 
 
Muhammad Syarkawi Rauf 
Chairman of KPPU 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Business competition is a major topic in both legal and economic studies. There-
fore, a multidisciplinary approach is imperative in the assessment of business compe-
tition. In this approach, the role of universities is very important to fill the theoretical 
foundation so that the policy in handling cases of business competition can be taken 
appropriately. 
The Business Competition Lecturer Forum (FDPU) in Indonesia is an inde-
pendently founded academic association for the need to discuss business competition 
issues, through a multidisciplinary approach. Its members are spread from all over 
Indonesia, including lecturers from the areas of law, economics, and business, com-
ing from public and private universities. The activities of FDPU are very diverse, 
such as seminars, workshops, and publications. In those activities, the FDPU can co-
operate with other institutions, both government and private. The current internation-
al seminar held in Nusa Dua, Bali, Indonesia is one of them, in cooperation with the 
Indonesian Commission for Supervision of Business Competition (KPPU). 
Because the preparation time of this seminar is quite short, the participation of 
this seminar is not enough socialized. Nevertheless, the reviewer's role to evaluate 
the papers sent at the panel session, as the results presented in this proceeding, is 
quite encouraging. For that, I would like to acknowledge Dr. Udin Silalahi and Dr. 
Dedie S. Martadisasta together with the papers contributors for their hard work. 
Thanks also to the KPPU who have facilitated this seminar. Hopefully this proceed-
ing is useful to add references to business competition. 
 
Nusa Dua, Bali, September 6, 2017 
 
 
 
Shidarta 
Chairman of FDPU 
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Abstract 
Merger control is one of the important aspects in the business competition re-
gime, considering the impact of merger can lead to monopolistic practices and 
unfair business competition. The purpose of merger control in the perspective 
of competition law is to prevent potential violations of anti-monopoly laws 
through corporate actions in the form of mergers or acquisitions. Business 
competition supervisory authority in Indonesia (KPPU) has a role in control-
ling mergers by defining criteria for mergers, such as notification systems, noti-
fication conditions, substantive tests and time periods, notification results, and 
other technical matters related to parties required to make notifications, for-
eign mergers and challenges. How does the system of merger control in Indo-
nesia and its comparison with the system in other ASEAN Member States 
(AMS)? And how AMS synergize on regional merger control system, particular-
ly in the ASEAN region? One of the most interesting things about the merger 
control system in Indonesia is using mandatory post merger notification, that 
can lead to a heavy penalty for late reporting. This merger control comparative 
study aims to know merger control regulations and system in the ASEAN re-
gion, particularly some AMS which had already promulgated its competition 
law. The merger control in the ASEAN economic region requires an initial step 
to form a harmonization of the system by the competition authority of the re-
spective country.  
 
Keywords: Merger Control, Competition Law, ASEAN Member States. 
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A. Introduction 
Merger is a form of joining of two or more independent business actors or inte-
grating activities carried out by two business actors thoroughly and permanently.
1
 
There are three forms of merger in competition law, namely horizontal merger, verti-
cal merger, and conglomerate merger. A horizontal merger occurs when two compa-
nies have the same line of business join or when firms competing in the same indus-
try merge. Vertical mergers involve different stages of production operations that are 
interconnected with each other, from upstream to downstream. Vertical mergers can 
also take the form of two types, namely upstream vertical merger and downstream 
vertical merger. Conglomerate merger occurs when two companies do not have the 
same line of business join. In other words, a conglomerate merger occurs between 
non-competing firms and has no buyer-seller relationship. 
There are several objectives of the merger from the perspective of competition, 
among others:
2
 
1. Mergers, consolidations, and takeovers constantly improves economic effi-
ciency as an effort to improve national welfare; 
2. Prevent monopolistic practices and/or unfair business competition by busi-
ness actors as a result of merger, consolidation or acquisition; 
3. Mergers, consolidations or acquisitions aimed at enhancing effectiveness and 
efficiency in business activities. 
Corporate restructuring means a basic revitalization to all business conduct aim-
ing at creating more competitiveness. Such revitalization is not only related to busi-
ness aspect, but also organization, financial management, and legal aspect.
3
 To com-
pete with big corporations both overseas and domestic, a company always tries to 
strengthen its capital, reduce production cost, pursue tax planning, increase produc-
tion cost, trying to produce goods at the most efficient point aiming at increasing 
                                                 
1
Earnest Gellhorn and William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Law and Economics (St. Paul, Mennesota: West 
Publishing, 1994), p. 348. 
2
The KPPU Regulation No. 2 Year 2013 (Merger Guideline), Appendix, p. 1. 
3
Placidius Sudibyo, “Restrukturisasi Perusahaan,” ("Corporate Restructuring"), paper presented at Na-
tional Seminar on Corporate Restructuring Organized by Faculty of Law for the 41st Anniversary of 
Diponegoro University, Semarang, September 28, 1988). 
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profit, and at the same time reduce inefficiency.
4
 
In general, maximizing profit can be expected from merger and acquisition, be-
cause merger and acquisition can reduce production cost that is resulting to a more 
efficient product.
5
 In this paper, merger comprises of merger, consolidation, and ac-
quisition. Efficiency is created through the economic scale of the merger companies 
in their production aspect. In addition to it, efficiency can be achieved through a 
merger scheme such as exploiting economic scope, marketing efficiency, or central-
izing research and development. Hence, merger can be used as a solution when busi-
ness actor facing some difficulties, particularly liquidity, so that creditor, owner and 
employees can be protected from bankruptcy.
6
 
Merger activities can be pro or anti competition. It can be anti-competitive if 
there is no control from the competition authorities. The existence of mergers in the 
business world should have a positive impact on failed companies. However, in prac-
tice, many merger activities are misused by business actors intending to expand their 
market share. In addition, there is often a clash between merger interests and effi-
ciency reasons and business competition. Merger can directly or indirectly bring a 
relatively large influence on the competitive conditions in the relevant market. It can 
also cause or strengthen market power by increasing concentration on relevant mar-
ket. The increase in market power can also increase their ability to coordinate either 
implicitly or explicitly.
7
 
The main concern of competition law is more on the negative impact of merger. 
Therefore, the control of mergers by the competition authority is aimed at preventing 
monopolistic practices and unfair business competition in the relevant market. Mer-
ger, consolidation, or acquisition can affect market concentration in the relevant 
market. These three kinds of corporate actions can lead to increase or decrease of 
                                                 
4
Viscusi, W. Kip, John M. Vernon and Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, Economics of Regulation and Anti-
trust, 3rd Ed., (London: The MIT Press, 2001), p. 195.  
5
Syamsul Maarif, Merger Dalam Perspektif Hukum Persaingan Usaha (Merger in the Business Com-
petition Law Perspective), (Jakarta: PT. Penebar Swadaya, 2010), p. 10.   
6
Andi Fahmi Lubis, et. al., Hukum Persaingan Usaha Antara Teks dan Konteks (“Business Competi-
tion Law Between Text and Context”), (Jakarta: The Business Competition Supervisory Commission 
(KPPU) in cooperation with Deutsche Gesselschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH, 
2009), p. 189. 
7
Debra J. Pearlstein, et.al., Antitrust Law Developments, 5th ed. Vol. I (American Bar Association, 
2002), p. 317-319.  
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competition in the market that can be potentially harmful to consumer and the socie-
ty.  
In the United States, the main concern of the merger is the creation or strength-
ening of the market power of the merger company. While in the EU, some of the 
concern as a result of a merger, among others: 
1. Fear of the birth of a giant business; 
2. Foreign-controlled of strategic sectors; 
3. Resulting in unemployment at merger related companies. 
This is an important issue which often raise in the merger control such as juris-
dictional thresholds, notification system, either mandatory or voluntary, criteria of 
foreign merger, notification requirement, duration reporting period until the issuance 
of opinion of the competition authority, as well as sanctions for infringement of mer-
ger control regulations. Competition law generally prohibits three main practices: (i) 
anti-competitive agreements; (ii) abuse of a dominant position or a monopoly; (iii) 
anti-competitive mergers. It can also have provisions related to unfair commercial 
practices.
8
 Generally, competition law covers the following categories of mergers: 
mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures (joint ventures may be regulated either un-
der merger or anti-competitive agreement provisions).  
Mergers falling under the prohibition should be screened and approved by the 
Competition Authority or other competent agency. Competition law may establish a 
system of either voluntary or mandatory notification of the (proposed) transaction to 
the Competition Authority. Competition law often provides for minimum (market 
share and/or turnover) thresholds over which a transaction shall or may be notified. 
Where notification is mandatory, failure to notify may lead to sanctions. Generally, a 
merger cannot be completed until approved by the Competition Authority.  
This paper aimed to conducting comparative study of merger control in Indone-
sia as well as in some AMS. That is because merger control regulations can affect 
business activities in the ASEAN region, particularly after the promulgation of 
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) as of the end of 2015. This paper also aims to 
describe merger control system, either voluntary or mandatory notification of the 
                                                 
8
Le Luong Minh, Handbook on Competition Policy and Law in ASEAN for Business 2013, 3
rd
 Ed., Ja-
karta: ASEAN Secretariat, May 2013.  
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transaction to competition authority, the thresholds over which a transaction shall or 
may be notified, the substantive test, including the sanction of non-compliant with 
such regulations.  
 
B. Merger Control System from the Perspective of Competition Law 
Merger discussion usually also involves reporting system, the relevant competi-
tion authority, obligation to report before or after effective date, threshold criteria, 
substantive test, the Commission‟s opinion consisting of either objection, or no ob-
jection, and/or no objection with certain conditions. Here we choose comparison in 
four ASEAN member states (AMS), namely Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Sin-
gapore. The reason for that is because those four countries had already issued merger 
control regulations.  
1. Merger Notification System and the Relevant Competition Authority 
In Indonesia, merger regulation is regulated in Law No. 5 Year 1999 concerning 
Prohibitions of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition (Law No. 
5/1999) article 28 and article 29, as well as in the Government Regulation No. 57 
Year 2010 regarding Merger and Acquisition (PP No. 57/2010). A specific technical 
regulation to implement the aforementioned Government Regulation is made by the 
Indonesian Anti Monopoly Agency (KPPU) by issuing the Commission Regulation 
number 02 Year 2013 regarding Merger Guideline. KPPU is an independent institu-
tion which has the authority to handle, decide or conduct an investigation of a mo-
nopoly practices case, either government or private sector having conflict of interest. 
In the exercise of authority and duties the agency is accountable to the president.
9
 
One of the duties of KPPU is to conduct merger review. 
One of the ASEAN Member Countries (AMS) which regulates the merger and 
implementing it is Thailand. This country regulates the provisions of merger in Sec-
tion 26 Trade Competition Act (TCA) BE 3542 (1999). Section 26 TCA prohibits 
mergers of businesses that may result in a monopoly or unfair competition, as pre-
scribed by the Trade Competition Commission (TCC), unless permission is obtained 
from the TCC. The TCA empowers the TCC to enforce the merger control provi-
                                                 
9
Hermansyah, Pokok-Pokok Hukum Persaingan Usaha di Indonesia (“The Principles of Business 
Competition Law in Indonesia”) (Jakarta: Kencana, 2008), 1
st 
Ed., p. 73.  
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sions. In addition, the TCC is responsible for prescribing notifications to enforce the 
TCA, including issuing notifications concerning the specific process by which cer-
tain mergers will be examined. TCC is empowered to set a minimum threshold of 
market share, total sales, amount of capital, the number of shares or quantity of assets 
that will be subject to prohibition under this section, this is part of the pre-merger no-
tification requirement.  
Merger control provisions mandating pre-merger notification filing are included 
in Vietnam‟s competition legislation. Article 18 of the Law on Competition No. 
27/2004/ QH11 prohibits mergers and acquisitions that result in a combined market 
share of 50%, unless expressly exempted by government legislation. The merger 
control regime entails mandatory pre-merger notification to the Vietnam Competition 
Authority (VCA), if the post-merger or post-acquisition combined market share is 
between 30% and 50%. The VCA, which is responsible for discovering, investigat-
ing, collecting, and searching for relevant evidence in restrictive competition cases,
10 
co-exists with the Vietnam Competition Council (VCC), which is in charge of judg-
ing, making decisions, and resolving the complaints related to the competition re-
striction cases.
11
 
The relevant regulation is the Singapore Competition Act (SCA), which was 
passed in October 2004. The SCA is enforced by the Competition Commission of 
Singapore (CCS), which was established as a statutory body under the SCA, and is 
under the purview of the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The CCS has power to in-
vestigate and impose sanctions. The SCA applies generally to prohibit: anticompeti-
tive agreements,
12
 the abuse of dominant position,
13
 and mergers and acquisitions 
that substantially, or maybe expected to substantially, lessen competition within any 
market in Singapore.
14
 The SCA was implemented in three phases, on 1 January 
2005, the provisions establishing the Commission came into force. The provisions on 
anticompetitive agreements, decisions and practices, abuse of dominance, enforce-
                                                 
10
Article 49 of the Vietnam Competition Act. 
11
Article 53 of the Vietnam Competition Act. 
12
Section 34 the Singapore Competition Act, Chapter 50B, (Original Enactment: Act 4; Revised Edi-
tion 2006, 31
st
 January 2006) 
13
Section 47 the Singapore Competition Act. 
14
Section 54 the Singapore Competition Act. 
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ment, appeal processes and other miscellaneous areas under the Competition Act 
came into force on 1 January 2006. The provisions relating to mergers and acquisi-
tions came into force on 1 July 2007. 
The discussion of the merger reporting system is whether the reporting nature is 
mandatory or voluntary before (pre-merger) or after effective merger (post-merger). 
One of the fundamental differences of merger control in Indonesia lies in its report-
ing system which legally requires reporting to be made after mergers and acquisi-
tions are effective on a post-merger basis rather than before mergers (pre-merger no-
tification) as generally done in other countries.
15
 This is caused by the content of Ar-
ticle 29 of Law No. 5/1999 explicitly stating that reporting must be made no later 
than 30 working days after the date of merger and acquisition. Therefore, when a 
merger has been effectively enacted juridically becomes very important to be identi-
fied, and that date will be the starting point for the calculation of 30 working days of 
the business actors limit to report the merger or acquisition. The delay in making a 
notice to KPPU causes the business actor to pay a significant fine of Rp 1 Billion 
(US $ 110 thousand) per working day of delay with a maximum fine of Rp 25 Billion 
(US $ 2.84 million).
16
  
Thailand‟s generic competition law includes a mandatory merger control filing 
regime, but with no fixed filing deadlines or guidelines for notification. Section 26 of 
The Trade Competition Act 1999 (TCA) prohibits companies from operating any 
merger that might give rise to a monopoly or unfair competition. The merger control 
regime entails mandatory notification to the Office of Thai Trade Competition 
Commission (TCC) once certain thresholds are met.
17  
However, as the specific 
thresholds that have to be met to trigger mandatory notification have yet to be re-
leased, Section 26 of the TCA is not enforceable.
18 
Accordingly, it may be concluded 
that it is possible for merging parties to bypass Section 26 of TCA as merger filing is 
                                                 
15
Syamsul Maarif, Merger Dalam Perspektif Hukum Persaingan Usaha (“Merger in the Business 
Competition Law Perspective”) (Jakarta: Degraf Publishing, 2010), p. 32. 
16
Article 6 Government Regulation No 57/2010. 
17
Section 26 of the Trade Competition Act 1999 (Thailand). 
18
http://otcc.dit.go.th/otcc/ index_en.php. accessed 12 February 2016. 
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not yet in force.
19
  
The TCA empowers the TCC to enforce the merger control provisions. The TCC 
is responsible for prescribing notifications to enforce of the TCA, including issuing 
notifications concerning the specific process by which certain mergers will be exam-
ined. The TCC is empowered to set a minimum threshold of market share, total sales, 
amount of capital, the number of shares or quantity of assets that will be subject to 
prohibition under Section 26. This is part of pre-merger notification requirement. As 
no notification pursuant to Section 26 has been issued, the restrictions on mergers are 
not enforceable.
20
 
Singapore‟s governing competition laws prescribed under the Competition Act, 
Section 50B of Singapore (SCA) includes a merger control regime that is based on 
voluntary notification. Section 54 of the Act came into force in 2007, and prohibits 
mergers (including autonomous full-function joint ventures made on a lasting basis) 
that have resulted, or may be expected to result, in a substantial lessening of competi-
tion within any market in Singapore for goods and services.
21 
Practitioners should be 
aware that while merger notification to the CCS is voluntary, the CCS requires all 
parties to mergers to conduct a mandatory self-assessment, in accordance with the 
methodologies in the guidelines published by the CCS, read alongside its decided 
cases, on whether a merger filing is necessary. The self-assessment must be docu-
mented in a customary form which the CCS would accept as documentary evidence 
in order for the self-assessment to be accepted by the CCS.  
The merger reporting system in some ASEAN Member Countries (AMSs) gen-
erally ordered to report before the merger was effective. This is a preventive effort of 
competition authorities to conduct an assessment of mergers that could lead to mo-
nopolistic practices and unfair business competition. The merger provisions in Indo-
nesia are the only one that stipulates the mandatory post-merger notification system, 
with the consequence of imposing high sanctions on reporting delays. Therefore, the 
                                                 
19
Daren Shiau and Elsa Chen, “ASEAN Developments in Merger Control”, Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice, 2014, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 151-152.  
20
Ibid. 
21
The Section 54 Prohibition may apply even where the merger takes place outside of Singapore, or 
where any merger party is located outside Singapore, so long as the merger has effect on any market 
in Singapore.  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draft amendments to antimonopoly laws proposed by the House of Representatives 
changed the reporting system to mandatory post-merger notification. This will 
change the pattern, that every merger plan that meets all requirements of the merger 
or threshold definition aspect, must be reported to KPPU. 
2. Jurisdiction, Threshold, and Substantive Test 
There are limits to reporting the merger to KPPU, and there are at least three 
conditions that must be reported, namely fulfillment of: 
a. definitions of mergers; 
b. not merger between affiliated companies; 
c. the asset or turnover threshold. 
 
ad. a) Merger Definition  
Government Regulation (GR) No. 57/2010 has defined the merger. But the im-
portant thing to note is the concept of control, especially in terms of acquisitions. The 
question of what percentage of the company's shares is taken over so that the defini-
tion of acquisition is met must always be linked to the concept of change in control. 
Acquisitions are deemed to occur in the event of a change of control, regardless of 
percentage of the company's shares are taken over.
22
  
ad. b) Merger between Affiliated Companies 
GR 57/2010 expressly states that merger or acquisition between affiliated com-
panies is not an object that must be reported to KPPU. This is based on the notion 
that the focus of competition law is not on the event of mergers and acquisitions, but 
on the impact of mergers on competitiveness. 
ad. c) Threshold of Asset or Turnover 
Article 29 of Law No. 5/1999 specifically limits mergers that reach certain val-
ues of assets and turnover which must be reported to the KPPU. GR 57/2010 has 
stipulated the asset value of Rp 2.5 trillion or more and/or the turnover value of Rp 5 
trillion or more.
23
 As for the banking sector, it is based on the asset value of Rp 20 
trillion or more.
24
 Whether a merger is qualified and/or does not require intense dia-
                                                 
22
Article 1 Government Regulation (GR) No 57/2010. 
23
Article 5 paragraph (2) GR No 57/2010. 
24
Article 5 paragraph (3) Gr No 57/2010. 
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logue between the merger party and the KPPU is depending on the complexity. In 
practice, KPPU is always open for discussion to assess whether a merger needs to be 
reported or not. Opportunities to open the dialogue will prevent the company from 
being fined or sanctioned from delay in reporting. 
Pursuant to Section 26 TCA, the merger of businesses in Thailand include the 
following: 
1) The merger made by a producer with another producer, by a distributor with 
another distributor, by a producer with a distributor, or by a service provider 
with another service provider, which has the effect of maintaining the status 
of one business and terminating the status of the other business or creating a 
new business;  
2) The purchase of the whole or part of assets of another business with a view to 
controlling business administration policies, administration and management;  
3) The purchase of the whole or part of shares of another business with a view to 
controlling business administration policies, administration and management.  
Once the transaction is determined to be within the scope of the merger of busi-
nesses, that transaction will be evaluated against the criteria set by the TCC. A busi-
ness operator who is involved in the of businesses as aforementioned that triggers the 
minimum threshold as prescribed in the notification by the TCC must obtain approv-
al from the TCC. 
Filing will be mandatory if the merger may result in a monopoly or unfair com-
petition as prescribed in the notification issued by the TCC. An applicant who will 
perform a merger under section 26 of the TCA will be required to submit an applica-
tion to the TCC in accordance with the form, rules, procedures, and conditions pre-
scribed by the TCC pursuant to section 35 of the TCA. In addition, section 35 of the 
TCA requires the contents of an application for approval of a proposed merger of 
businesses, must specify, at least, the following: 
1) the reasons and necessity for the proposed merger; 
2) the method of achieving the proposed merger; and 
3) the duration of the proposed merger. 
The TCC has not issued any notifications on the filing application or the mini-
mum thresholds for mergers. Therefore, pre-merger filing is not required, and there is 
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no notification prescribing any exceptions.
25
 
In Singapore, generally merger should be notified to the SCA if the merger par-
ties think the merger may result in a substantial lessening of competition (SLC) with-
in any market in Singapore. Merger parties should note the risk that if a merger is not 
notified, and the SCA may investigate a merger or anticipated merger on its own ini-
tiative if it has reasonable grounds for believing that Section 54 been infringed or 
will be infringed. The SCA has the ability to subsequently make directions or impose 
financial penalties in respect of any infringement.
26
 
The SCA is unlikely to consider to consider a merger or anticipated merger to 
give rise to competition concerns unless it meets or crosses the following indicative 
thresholds: 
a. The merged entity will have a market share of 40% or more; 
b. The merged entity will have a market share of between 20% or 40% and the 
post-merger market share of the three largest firms, that is, the concentration 
ratio of three firms (CR3), is 70% or more. 
The above thresholds are merely indicative, and the SCA may investigate merger 
situations that fall below these indicative thresholds in appropriate circumstances. 
Conversely, merger situations that meet or exceed the thresholds stated in the notifi-
cation guidelines are not necessarily prohibited by section 54. 
In the case of a test system of a merger plan, there shall be at least 3 (three) main 
reasons for preventing or closing a merger transaction, namely (1) that a merger is 
conducted to establish a dominant position (dominant position=DP test); or (2) to 
substantially reduce competition (substantial lessening competition=SLC test); or (3) 
harmful to the public interest (PI test).  
DP test is more commonly known as the substance test used in Europe, this 
standard essentially says that merger transactions should be prevented "(if it is) likely 
to create or strengthening dominant position. SLC test is used by competition author-
ities in the United States, which is then followed by many countries. In essence the 
                                                 
25
Pakdee Paknara and Pattraporn Poovasathien, “Thailand Merger Control”, 
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SLC test says that merger transactions should be banned "(if it is) likely to substan-
tially lessen competition or to facilitate its exercise". Some criteria must be analyzed 
to determine whether a merger transaction has the potential to reduce competition. 
The PI test says that mergers need to be prohibited when harming the public interest. 
In the United States, for example, the public interest, particularly employment, is 
taken into account in assessing merger transactions in the rail and telecommunica-
tions sectors. 
The regulations on mergers in Indonesia do not explicitly address the use of test-
ing system but from the procedures it can be categorized that Indonesia uses SLC 
test. Related to the substantive test, GR 57/2010 explains at least five factors that will 
be assessed to see the impact of competition resulted from a merger: 
a. market concentration; 
b. barriers to entry; 
c. the potential of anti-competitive behavior; 
d. efficiency; and/or 
e. bankruptcy. 
The Merger Guidelines provide further elaboration of each of those factors and 
in the assessment phase. If KPPU finds the reason of merger will cause negative im-
pact to competition in further (comprehensive) assessment stage. KPPU will open a 
dialogue to discuss the possibility of actions needed by business actors who merger 
remedies in order to maintain the competition condition. KPPU also provides the 
possibility of remedies in order to maintain fair competition.  
The type of substantive test conducted by KPPU shows the similarity of merger 
control system in Singapore and Thailand, using Substantial Lessening Competition 
(SLC) test. This testing system does not merely consider the impact after a merger 
resulting in a dominant position, called the Dominant Position (DP) test, or even a 
Public Interest (PI) test.
27
  
After conducting the assessment, KPPU will issue a Commission Opinion on the 
merger or acquisition, either through the Consultation scheme or the Notification 
scheme. There are three possible opinions of the Commission, namely:
 28
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a. No allegations of monopolistic practices or unfair business competition re-
sulting from merger (no objection); 
b. There are allegations of monopolistic practices or unfair business competition 
of merger merger (objection); 
c. There is no allegation of monopolistic practices or unfair business competi-
tion due to merger with a form of advice / guidance to be met (conditionally 
no objection). 
Based on the opinion of points b and c above, the merger party can not take any 
legal action against the Commission's opinion, because the law does not regulate so. 
Merger Guidelines states that if the business actor after obtaining the Opinion of 
Commission point c above does not carry out the record or essence of the note given, 
or after obtaining Commission Opinion b above b still carry out the merger or acqui-
sition, KPPU will take necessary action based on article 28 of Law no. 5/1999. In 
this case, KPPU has some differences of opinion with the merger party on the impact 
of the merger, so KPPU continued the process of handling cases which will be ended 
in a final decision.
29
  
The table below shows the differences in merger control system in some ASEAN 
countries.  
No AMS Provisions 
Type of  
Notifications 
Threshold 
Length of 
Review 
Penalty 
1 Indonesia  Art. 28, art. 
29 Law No. 
5/1999 
Voluntary pre-
merger 
notification.  
Mandatory 
post-merger 
notification, if 
thresholds are 
met.  
 
the asset 
exceeds IDR 
2.5 trillion; or 
the turnover 
exceeds IDR 5 
trillion or 
more than 20 
trillion for 
banking 
 
Pre-merger 
notification: 
Phase 1 
Review: 
maximum of 
30 working 
days.   
Phase 2 
Review: 
maximum of 
60 working 
days.   
Post-merger 
notification: 
Maximum of 
90 working 
days.  
(SLC test) 
Financial 
penalty of IDR 
1 billion for 
each day of 
delay up to a 
maximum fine 
of IDR 25 
billion. 
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2 Thailand Art 26 Trade 
Competition 
Act (TCA) 
BE 3542 
(1999). 
Mandatory 
merger 
notification if 
thresholds are 
met. There are 
currently no 
jurisdictional 
thresholds that 
have been 
issued. 
There are no 
jurisdictional 
thresholds. 
Jurisdictional 
thresholds are 
to be set by 
the 
notification, 
but no 
notifications 
have been 
issued yet.  
 
90 days. 
However, if 
a decision 
cannot be 
completed 
within such 
period, the 
TCC may 
extend up to 
15 days.  
 
If a filing is 
not made for a 
merger of the 
businesses 
under section 
26, a person 
would be 
liable to a 
term of 
imprisonment 
not exceeding 
three years or 
a fine of not 
exceeding 
THB 6 
million, or 
both. A repeat 
offender is 
liable to 
double the 
penalty.  
3 Vietnam  Section 16 to 
24, The 
Competition 
Law No: 
27/2004/QH 
11  
 
Mandatory 
merger 
notification if 
thresholds are 
met.  
 
Economic 
concentrations 
where the 
parties have a 
combined 
market share 
of between 
30% and 50% 
are required to 
notify.  
45 days with 
up to two 
extensions of 
a maximum 
of 30 days 
each.  
 
Financial 
penalty of 1% 
- 3% of the 
total revenue 
in the financial 
year prior to 
the year in 
which there 
was a failure 
to notify shall 
be applied 
accordingly.  
4 Singapore Section 54, 
Chapter 50B 
Competition 
Act, Original 
Enactment 
Act 46 of 
2004, 
Revised 
Edition 31
st
 
January 2006 
 
Voluntary 
notification is 
encouraged for 
mergers that 
are likely to 
substantially 
lessen 
competition.  
The merged 
entity will 
have a market 
share of 40% 
or more; or   
The merged 
entity will 
have a market 
share of 
between 20% 
to 40% and the 
post-merger 
combined 
market share 
of the three 
largest firms is 
70% or more 
Phase 1 
Review – 30 
working 
days. 
 
Phase 2 
Review – 
120 working 
days.  
 
Merger parties 
may face a 
financial 
penalty not 
exceeding 
10% of the 
turnover of 
each relevant 
merger party.  
 
5 Malaysia Competition 
Act 712, 
2010. 
(No merger 
provisions) 
NA NA NA NA 
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The table above shows that each country in comparison has set a merger control 
system except Malaysia. Five other AMS governed the merger control in the provi-
sions of competition law, such as: 
1. Philippines: Chapter IV Section 16 – Section 23 Competition Act, No. 
10667, 2015; 
2. Brunai Darussalam: Chapter IV Section 23 – Section 30 Competition Order, 
2015 Art 83 (3) Constitution of Brunai; 
3. Myanmar: Chapter X, Section 30 - Section 33 The Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Law 
No. 9, 2015 (Competition Law); 
4. Lao: Article 2 and 37 Law on Business Competition No. 60/NA 14 July 
2015) 
5. Cambodia: Draft Law on Competition of Cambodia (7 March 2016); 
 
Foreign mergers are also included in the merger control system in Indonesia, 
considering the activities of business actors who do not recognize national borders. 
Although Law No. 5/1999 and GR No. 57/2010 does not govern this matter, the 
Merger Guideline stipulates it. KPPU states that it has jurisdiction over merger out-
side Indonesia as long as the merger has a direct impact on Indonesia domestic mar-
ket. For foreign mergers, all reporting systems, reporting requirements, substantive 
tests, and applicable legal measures are similar to mergers occurring within the terri-
tory of Indonesia. Especially for the threshold value of the assets and turnover, Mer-
ger Guideline states that the assets are assets located calculated in parts of Indonesia 
and the turnover is sales originating in the territory of Indonesia. Thus, the asset 
threshold and turnover for foreign mergers do not take into account assets and turno-
ver in abroad countries.
30
 
In addition, Merger Guideline shows that KPPU adopts single economic entity 
doctrine,
31
 because it considers business actors in Indonesia controlled by foreign 
party as one economic entity, so that Indonesian law can be applied to overseas par-
                                                 
30
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ent company through extension of its business in Indonesia. It is stated in the Merger 
Guidelines that KPPU can impose a fine to a negligent foreign merger; or to business 
actors residing in Indonesia controlled by overseas business actors.
32
 
 
3. The Implementation of Merger Control Based on Law No. 5/1999 
Here is one example of KPPU‟s evaluation of the merger report in Indonesia. On 
February 12, 2013 KPPU has received PT Carrefour Indonesia Takeover Notification 
by PT Trans Retail which has been registered with registration number A10713. On 
22 April 2013, the Notice document shall be declared complete and the Commission 
shall conduct the Rating by issuing the KPPU Decision Number 11/KPPU/Kep/ 
IV/2013. 
The result of assessment of the acquisition of PT Carrefour Indonesia shares by 
PT Trans Retail Indonesia is that with regard to the difference in price and 
specification of the products owned by CT Corp and PT Carrefour Indonesia, there is 
no overlap market due to the acquisition of PT Carrefour Indonesia shares by PT 
Trans Retail. After the acquisition, PT Trans Retail Indonesia will continue to use the 
Carrefour brand, and will consider the change of name to Trans-Carrefour. In the 
absence of overlapping business activities from the parties, it will not change the 
market structure in Indonesia's retail industry. The takeover of PT Carrefour 
Indonesia did not raise concerns about Carrefour's competitors and suppliers. In 
addition, there will be no foreclosure barriers due to the takeover of PT Carrefour 
Indonesia by CT Corp. The CT Corp has only one mall in Bandung City, so that 
other retail competitors still have the option to used other mall to conduct their 
business activities. 
The conclusion made by KPPU is that the Commission considered that there was 
no allegation of monopolistic practices or unfair business competition caused by the 
acquisition of shares, as follows: 
1) PT Trans Retail and PT Carrefour Indonesia do not have the same business 
activities; 
2) in terms of price and product characteristics, PT Trans Retail products are not 
in the same relevant market with PT Carrefour Indonesia; 
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3) there will be no foreclosure barriers in the mall and shoping mall 
management market with the retail market, due to the large number of 
options to cooperate with other mall managers; 
4) The Commission's opinion is only limited to the process of PT Carrefour 
Indonesia's shares takeover by PT Trans Retail. If in the future there is anti-
competitive behavior done by both parties and subsidiaries, then the behavior 
is not excluded from Law Number 5 Year 1999 concerning Prohibition of 
Monopolistic Practices and or Unfair Business Competition. 
Based on the above conclusions, the Commission is of the opinion that there is 
no allegation of monopolistic practices or unfair business competition caused by the 
acquisition of PT Carrefour Indonesia shares by PT Trans Retail. 
 
C. The Need of Merger Control in ASEAN Region 
Economic cooperation at the level of ASEAN within the ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC) includes several elements such as (i) a single market and produc-
tion base, (ii) a highly competitive economic region, (iii) a region of equitable eco-
nomic development, and (iv) a region fully integrated into the global economy. In the 
AEC Blueprint, competition policy is identified as the keyword for creating “a highly 
competitive economic region”. Such objective is to be achieved gradually by the year 
2015. Such accomplishment in the area of business competition is marked by the fi-
nalization of guidelines under the title Guidelines on Developing Core Competencies 
Policy and Law for ASEAN.
33
  
The embryo of cooperation in the area of competition policy and law was 
marked by, among other things, the establishment of the AEGC (ASEAN Experts 
Group on Competition).
34
 Further development of cooperation was marked by the es-
tablishment of Guidelines on Developing Core Competencies Policy and Law for 
ASEAN Regional Guidelines on Competition Policy in 2010 serving as a priority for 
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AEGC.
35
 Subsequently, at a meeting in Bangkok on November 28-29, 2012 the said 
document was finalized under the title Guidelines on Developing Core Competencies 
Policy and Law for ASEAN.
36
 
The Regional Guidelines are based on the experience of individual countries as 
well as international best practices. Such Guidelines provide for various policy and 
institutional choices which can serve as guidelines for ASEAN Member States (here-
inafter referred to as AMSs) in the context of endeavors towards creating an envi-
ronment for fair business competition. The Guidelines are expected to raise aware-
ness among AMSs about the significance of competition policy, aimed at encourag-
ing development and enhancing cooperation among AMSs. 
In general, the Guidelines set out provisions concerning the objective of estab-
lishing the guidelines, the benefits of competition policy, the scope of Competition 
Policy and Law (CPL), the role and responsibility of competition authorities, law en-
forcement powers, due process of law, technical assistance and capacity building, 
advocacy, and international cooperation in the area of competition in the context of 
free trade agreements (FTAs). The Guidelines adopted in August 2010 provide for 
three primary prohibitions, namely (i) anticompetitive agreements; (ii) abuse of a 
dominant position; and (iii) anticompetitive mergers (and acquisitions). However, 
neither the EC Blueprint nor the ASEAN Regional Guidelines on Competition have a 
binding effect on the respective member states.
37
  
The mutual agreement on the prohibition of anti-competitive merger will bring 
legal consequences for every AMS to follow the agreement by enacting a joint mer-
ger control system in ASEAN region. The first thing is to establish the rules and reg-
ulations on the merger control system in each AMS state. To date, only four AMS 
countries, namely Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam and Singapore have explicitly ar-
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ranged the following formation of the Merger Guidelines. 
Malaysia is the one of the AMS with a generic competition law that does not in-
clude merger control provisions. The Competition Act 2010 (effective January 2012) 
(the MyCC Act) only regulates anticompetitive agreements
38 
and abuse of dominant 
market positions,
39 
but does not regulate anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions. 
The Malaysia Competition Commission (MyCC) is the enforcement agency for the 
MyCC Act.
40
 Similarly, Myanmar has not explicitly set the mechanism of merger 
control on The Competition Law (The Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Law No. 9, 2015) The 
7th
 
Waxing Day of Taboung, 1376 M.E (24th
 
February, 2015). 
Meanwhile, the Philippines regulates merger control within Act No. 10667 con-
cerning di Chapter IV concerning Mergers and Acquisitions, Section 16 - section 23, 
an Act Providing for a National Competition Policy Prohibiting Anti-Competitive 
Agreements, Abuse of Dominant Positions and Anti-Competitive Mergers and Ac-
quititions, establishing the Philippine Competition Commission and Appropriating 
Funds therefor. Brunai also stipulates merger control in Chapter IV, section 23-30 
Constitution of Brunei Darussalam, Order Made Under Article 83(3) Competition 
Order, 2015. Myanmar regulates merger control on Chapter X, Section 30 - Section 
33 The Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Law No. 9, 2015. While Cambodia is still drafting its 
competition law in draft Law on Competition of Cambodia, version 5.5. 7 March 
2016. 
Merger control regulations in the ASEAN economic region is an important thing 
as a guarantee of business certainty. Currently only some AMS countries have rules 
and guidelines for the implementation of merger control, while some AMS countries 
only have the law without further implementing regulations. In contrary, some coun-
tries have not even regulated it. Meanwhile, there are some member states still draft-
ing antimonopoly laws. The diversity of these conditions will hinder the formation of 
a merger control mechanism in the ASEAN region. Nevertheless, the signing of the 
AMS Guidelines on Competition Policy and Law (CPL) will facilitate the merger 
control in the ASEAN region. 
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D. Conclusion  
Based on the above explanations, we conclude that all ASEAN Member States in 
fact have had competition law, except for Cambodia which is still in the the final 
draft for further promulgation. With respect to merger control, there are several as-
pects to be examined, such as such as notification systems, notification conditions, 
substantive tests and time periods, notification results, and other technical matters re-
lated to parties required to make notifications, foreign mergers and challenges; which 
need to be included in the competition laws and regulations. In the comparison 
among ten (10) AMS we find out that only Malaysia still has not regulate it in their 
competition law.  
Among ten AMS, only Indonesia adopts mandatory post merger notification and 
voluntary pre-merger notification; while other AMS adopt pre-merger notification 
only. Considering that the intention of merger control regulation is to preventing mo-
nopolistic practices and unfair business competition, therefore it would be better if 
Indonesia could adopt pre-merger notification, similar with other AMS. 
In view of the above, as the way forward, it would be best if AMS competition 
authorities can start to discuss and make harmonization to the merger control in the 
ASEAN region, so that the aim of ASEAN Economic Community in making an effi-
cient and competitive business environment can be achieved. 
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